- Paperback: 304 pages
- Publisher: John Wiley & Sons; 1 edition (14 November 2008)
- Language: English
- ISBN-10: 9780470393758
- ISBN-13: 978-0470393758
- ASIN: 0470393750
- Product Dimensions: 15.2 x 1.8 x 22.9 cm
- Boxed-product Weight: 363 g
- Average Customer Review: Be the first to review this item
- Amazon Bestsellers Rank: 366,769 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
A Demon of Our Own Design: Markets, Hedge Funds, and the Perils of Financial Innovation Paperback – 14 Nov 2008
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"A risk-management maven who's been on Wall Street for decades?Bookstaber's book shows us some complex strategies that very smart people followed to seemingly reduce risk?but that led to huge losses." (Newsweek)
"Mr. Bookstaber is one of Wall Street's 'rocket scientists'--mathematicians lured from academia to help create both complex financial instruments and new computer models for making investing decisions. In the book, he makes a simple point: The turmoil in the financial markets today comes less from changes in the economy--economic growth, for example, is half as volatile as it was 50 years ago--and more from some of the financial instruments (derivatives) that were designed to control risk." (The New York Times)
"Bright sparks like Mr Bookstaber ushered in a revolution that fuelled the boom in financial derivatives and Byzantine 'structured products.' The problem, he argues, is that this wizardry has made markets more crisis-prone, not less so. It has done this in two ways: by increasing complexity, and by forging tighter links between various markets and securities, making them dangerously interdependent." (The Economist)
"He understands the inner workings of financial markets...A liberal sparkling of juicy stories from the trading floor..." (The Economist)
"?smart book?Part memoir, part market forensics, the book gives an insider's view?" (Bloomberg News)
"Like many pessimistic observers, Richard Bookstaber thinks financial derivatives, Wall Street innovation and hedge funds will lead to a financial meltdown. What sets Mr. Bookstaber apart is that he has spent his career designing derivatives, working on Wall Street and running a hedge fund." (The Wall Street Journal)
"Every so often [a book] pops out of the pile with something original to say, or an original way of saying it. Richard Bookstaber, in A Demon of Our Own Design: Markets, Hedge Funds, and the Perils of Financial Innovation, accomplishes both of these rare feats." (Fortune)
"a must-read amidst the current market chaos" (BusinessWeek.com)
"Bookstaber is a former academic who went on to head risk management for Morgan Stanley and now runs a large hedge fund. He knows the subject and has written a lucid and readable book. To his aid he calls mathematics (from Bertrand Russell to Godel's theorem); physics (particularly Heisenberg's uncertainty principle); and even -- meteorology." (Financial Times)
"The book covers a lot about risk management that is relevant to capital markets conditions today and the liquidity crisis." (Financial Times, Saturday 25th August)
"...an insider's guide to markets, hedge funds and the perils of financial innovation. We saw plenty of those in 2007." (The Sunday Telegraph, Sunday 25th November 2007)
"I cannot recommend this book too highly. It is a clear exposition of what the combination of derivatives, leverage and hedge funds can do to the markets.
In short, A Demon of our Own Design is a guide to the dangerous financial markets we have created for ourselves by the clever innovations of structured finance, derivatives, credit default swaps and other newfangled products that are a mystery to the ordinary investor and even plenty of the sophisticates in the investment business. To understand the demonic risks we're taking, read this book."--Forbes.com
From the Back Cover
Named a top business book of the year by the Financial Times, Kiplinger's Personal Finance, and Library Journal
Praise for A Demon of Our Own Design
"This book is powerful stuff. When the hero of the story is a cockroach, you are assured of a controversial, illuminating, and fascinating discovery of where the financial risks really lurk and how to avoid them. Bookstaber knows whereof he speaks."
?Peter L. Bernstein, author of Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk
"Are you ready for the real deal? An insider, everysider view of the Wall Street calamities that have kept investing tantalizingly hot and frighteningly volatile since the crash of '87. For an in-depth, curtains-open, and coolly written exposition of Wall Street, Bookstaber is my man."
Professor of Finance, UC Berkeley
"He understands the inner workings of the financial markets. . . . A liberal sparkling of juicy stories from the trading floor."
"I cannot recommend this book too highly. It is a clear exposition of what the combination of derivatives, leverage, and hedge funds can do to the markets."
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The author explains numerous financial crises that occurred since the early eighties in technical details. However, on pg. 241, he synthesizes his analysis in just a few concise sentences. The 1987 crash was a vicious downward spiral caused by hedging actions (selling futures short associated with portfolio insurance) that reinforced the decline in stock values causing further hedging actions. The LTCM meltdown was caused by the forced asset sales at liquidation price triggered by creditors that resulted in further asset price decline. The dot.com bubble was due to the majority of traders being on the buy side of a very limited supply of hi-tech stocks that created a feedback loop of self-fulfilling prophecy. When dot.com IPOs met and exceeded investor demand, the market collapsed. In other parts of the book, he spends tens of pages on each of those crises. But, in a nutshell that is pretty much what they were about.
The key explanatory chapter is chapter 8 titled "Complexity, Tight Coupling, and Normal Accidents." Here the author explains how systems that are complex with many interconnected variables with unpredictable, nonlinear effects, that in turn are associated with tight coupling (denotes a chain-like reaction without much time to react or adapt to the consequence) are recipes for disasters. Those are called "normal accidents" meaning they are to be expected; but, you can't expect what they will be. So, you can't prevent them. "The more complex and tightly coupled the system, the greater the frequency of normal accidents." The author depicts numerous failures of complex systems with various levels of tight coupling including nuclear plants disasters (Three Mile Island, Chernobyl) and aerospace disasters (Challenger and Columbia missions that both killed seven crew members).
Financial derivatives make for perfect complex systems with tight coupling. They have numerous unpredictable nonlinear outcomes, high leverage, and lightning quick trading. Those characteristics make for what Warren Buffet called "financial weapons of mass destruction."
Adding to the vulnerability of financial complex systems is the "Butterfly Effect" (reference to Chaos theory). As financial models make even fractionally small errors, those tiny errors over multiple iterations compound and generate huge intractable outcome errors.
Another cause of complex vulnerability is scale. The business world has focused on economies of scale to extract a cost competitive edge. But, beyond a certain point scale does not contribute to economies but instead to complexities. In chapter 7 titled "Colossus" Bookstaber describes the forming of a financial conglomerate monster: Citigroup. He headed a market risk management group at Salomon that got acquired by Citi. And, he describes how the risk management function became unmanageable. Externally, tracking risk exposures globally in so many instruments, businesses, and geographies became impossible. Internally, the change in corporate scale expanded his risk management group to a dysfunctionally large level.
Bookstaber indicates that regulations does not work in reducing the risk within financial complex systems. By forcing banks to reduce existing risk exposures, they are forced to sell assets. Those forced sales cause asset values to drop further forcing further asset sales. This relates to Fisher's The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions. "Trying to control the risk ends up creating a liquidity crisis."
Forcing hedge funds towards increasing transparency is a self-defeating proposition. Hedge funds competitive edge are proprietary strategies. If their accounts become transparent, they pretty much go out of business.
Bookstaber makes an interesting connection between Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle and finance (pg. 223). In the quantum world, you can't improve the measurement of an electron's speed without impairing the measurement of its location. In the finance world, you can't increase transparency without decreasing liquidity. As mentioned, transparency would impair the hedge fund sector. And, the latter is the major liquidity provider for illiquid assets. Without hedge funds many such markets would not be viable.
If upcoming regulatory constraints do not impair the hedge fund sector, Bookstaber anticipates it could become a dominant force within the institutional investment world. His take is that if you take two equally brilliant investors, and the first one is limited to "long" strategies only and the other one is not and can avail himself to all sorts of other investment strategies, the latter one should prevail. And, that describes the difference between a traditional mutual fund and a hedge fund.
However, that is one instance where I may question Bookstaber's opinion. The hedge fund has to deliver gross returns that are so much higher than the mutual fund because it charges so much more (1% operating expense and 20% of profits vs only the 1% for the regular mutual fund). Bookstaber suggests the hedge fund compensates for that because of the inherent leverage in hedge fund strategies. But, by doing so a hedge fund takes on risk that renders it much more fragile than a regular fund. Earlier, Bookstaber states that many hedge funds "win a little, win a little, than lose a lot." Thus, hedge funds blow ups are more frequent than mutual fund ones. Additionally, there is already too much money in hedge funds to chase too few market inefficiencies. This ultimately makes a case for neither hedge funds or regular mutual funds but index funds instead.
Bookstaber addresses the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) in a most interesting way. He understands the subject better than most as he wrote his economics PhD thesis on the transmission of information through the markets. Bookstaber states that stock prices are driven by two components: one is information, and the other is liquidity factors. The EMH covers only partly the information component. That's because it makes some liberal assumptions such as that traders are perfectly rational, and that their actions do not affect the markets. But, the EMH does not cover the liquidity factors. Those include the actual float or supply of each stocks, transaction costs, and leverage constraints. And, often liquidity factors are the predominant drivers of investment prices. Bookstaber states on pg 213 "[liquidity] is the primary driver of crashes and bubbles as well." This makes sense. The information component is disseminated instantly and should be fully reflected in stock prices at all times (the EMH take). But, liquidity factors can get markets out of whack. As Bookstaber explained, the dot.com bubble was mainly fueled by a very small float (short supply) of hi-tech stock at the onset.
Bookstaber describes interesting statistical arbitrage strategies (paired stock trading) devised to differentiate between the information component of a stock price, that typically does not mean revert in the short term, vs the liquidity component that does. He indicates that this is easier said than done. As usual, the early traders who devised those strategies made a lot of money. But, the market is a rapidly learning machine and those Alpha returns were pretty much arbitraged out a long time ago. So, that's the puzzling thing about the EMH. The theory is far from perfect. Yet the markets are brutally efficient. Alpha returns depend on traders coming out with new investment strategies until they are replicated. At such point, they are forced to uncover Alpha returns some place else. So, efficiency is a moving target.
In the conclusion, Bookstaber makes recommendations on how to reduce the fragility of our financial system. We should reduce the tight coupling within the system. He proposes to do that by reducing leverage which in turn reduces liquidity and the speed of market activity (tight coupling). He also recommends selective evaluation of financial innovations to prevent dangerous complexities. Insiders will not like Bookstaber's recommendations and will argue that financial innovation has greatly improved wealth creation worldwide. But, you have to distinguish between benign vs complex financial innovations. It is easy to argue in favor of ATMs, debit cards, new mobile payment mechanisms, and online banking innovations. But, did we benefit from MBS, CDOs, and SIVs? Certainly not lately!